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International comparisons show that large cross-country differences exist in the 
overall macro extent of regulation of the economy. In this context, the main pur-
pose of the article is to investigate, why such differences exist by identifying and 
empirically verifying the effect of various factors that could potentially shape those 
differences. Empirical analysis based on the sample of 32 developed and demo-
cratic countries revealed that almost 70 % of variation in the macro extent of regu-
lation could be explained with 7 statistically significant explanatory variables. The 
econometric analysis revealed that the macro extent of regulation decreases with 
income inequality in society, with the level of economic development, with the size 
of economy, with the share of transfer spending in GDP and with the share of gov-
ernment employment in labour force. On the other hand, the extent of regulation is 
positively related to government ownership of enterprises and to presidential po-
litical regime.
Key words: Regulation, developed countries, cross-country differences, determi-
nants of regulation, econometric analysis
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1. Introduction




symmetrical  across countries,  indicating  that  large cross-country differences exist 
nowadays. In particular, huge cross-country differences exist in the (overall) macro 
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cally  identify various economic, political,  social and other  factors  influencing  the 
variations in the extent of regulation of the economy across countries and to empiri-
cally verify the effect of those factors with the use of multiple regression analysis. 
2. Regulation as non-budgetary segment of governmental 

















2  For example, see Gwartney and Lawson (2002).           





spending, as  it  is  in  the case of  regulation. Namely,  regulatory activities usually have  little fiscal 
implications, but they have profound economic effects and are, consequently, equally important as 
spending activities. Therefore, it is important to investigate also the size of “non-budgetary” govern-                     
ment, since ultimately this differentiates big from small government.
4  Specifically, the first one describes those regulatory activities that intervene directly in market decisions                           
such as pricing, competition, market entry, or exit; the second one describes those activities that prima-
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5  For example, Hopkins (1997) estimates that regulatory costs amount up to 15 per cent of GDP in                                 




6  In other words, enterprises concentrate on bargaining and seeking various ”deals” with government.                         
Nevertheless, these are usually ”zero-sum games”, as enterprises waist their resources on bargaining 
rather than on increasing output.
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•	 Size of the economy.
According to Pryor, this factor should have two counteracting influences. Because 








This  factor  also  should  have  counterbalancing  influences. Namely, Pryor  stresses 
that  it  is commonly believed  that governmental  regulation  increases as per capita 
income increases because the government has more resources to carry out regula-















the extent of  regulation of  the economy as substitutes, particularly  in  the  relation 
to the common fable that privatised government enterprises should be extensively 
regulated in order to prevent them exercising their market power, Pryor argues that 
governmental  regulation and ownership are complements,  since both of  them are 
needed to control private economic activity. 7
7  Pryor’s empirical analysis revealed that statistical confirmation received only two factors, namely                       
the  size  of  the  economy  and  income  inequality. His  results  suggest  that  the  degree  of  economic 
laissez-faire is inversely related to economic size and directly related to income inequality. He even 
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3. Empirical analysis of factors affecting cross-country differences in 
the macro extent of regulation











Econometric  modelling  is  based  on  a  sample  of  32  developed  (and  democratic) 
countries for which cross-sectional data on all relevant explanatory and dependent 















8  The sample consists of 27 OECD member countries (out of 30 OECD countries Iceland, Japan and                               
Turkey  are  excluded),  four  ex-transitional  non-OECD economies  (Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania  and 
Slovenia) and Chile as newly industrialised country and most developed country in Latin America.
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11 Regarding so-called income and openness channel, Pevcin (2004a) argues that the greater probability                         
exists of more open and more developed countries having parliamentary political regime and propor-
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•	 Dichotomous dummy variable for countries in transition (TRA). 
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3.2.  Results and discussion










































12  In Table 2, only statistically significant variables (at 90 % margin) are presented, values of t-statistics                               
and p-values being in parentheses. The elimination of variables is based on their statistical insignifi-
cance and on the extent they ”inflate” variance of the model. 
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14 The calculated values of the regression coefficients of the standardised variables (so-called beta coef-                         
ficients) show that income inequality in society is relatively the most important variable in explaining 
why differences in the extent of regulation across countries exist (see Table 2).
15 To some extent, this implies the possibility of existence of economies of scale in regulatory activities,                               
meaning that the same burden of regulation falls on larger number of population.
16 The value of regression coefficient for the variable OPN is highly statistically insignificant, possibly                           
indicating the fact that the effect of the openness on the extent of regulation is irrelevant when com-
paring developed countries.
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related to presidential political regime, which is in line with predictions about the 
existence of income and openness channel.
3.3. An inquiry into relationship between the size of budgetary and  
non-budgetary government


























18  In this context, it could be even argued that the possibility exists that the level of the influence of                                     
government on the private activities is a constant. Namely, government can influence activities either 
visibly through its spending activities or more ”invisibly” through regulation of economy.
19 These relations in forms of so-called transmission mechanisms could present a new form of under-                           
standing how government policies and spending are shaped. Still, further research should be done 
primarily with dynamic modelling, since the findings represent only a rough idea.
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4. Conclusion
The main question that tried to be answered in the article is, which economic, social, 










the  problem  of  ”model  underfitting”,  where  some  relevant  explanatory  variables 
are omitted. Nevertheless, the analysis revealed that the macro extent of regulation 
decreases with  income  inequality  in  society, with  the  level of  economic develop-
ment, with the size of economy, with the share of transfer spending in GDP and with 
the share of government employment in  labour force,  the later  two being implicit 
measures of  ”visible” government activity. This obviously  indicates,  that  the  size 
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Raspoloživi podaci pokazuju velike razlike u opsegu regulacije gospodarstva među 
državama. Svrha članka jest utvrditi zašto takve razlike postoje. To znači da je 
svrha analize predstavljene u članku identifikacija i empirijska provjera učinka 
različitih čimbenika na razlike u opsegu regulacije. Rezultati ekonometrijske anal-
ize temeljene na uzorku 32 razvijenih i demokratskih država pokazuju da 7 
statističko signifikantnih odrednica omogućava objašnjavanje gotovo 70 % vari-
jacije u opsegu regulacije gospodarstva među državama. Analiza pokazuje da je 
opseg regulacije gospodarstva u negativnoj relaciji sa stopom društvene nejedna-
kosti, stopom gospodarskog razvitka, veličinom države, opsegom vladinih trans-
fernih rashoda i opsegom zapošljavanja u vladinom sektoru. Nadalje, rezultati po-
kazuju da je opseg regulacije gospodarstva u pozitivnoj relaciji s opsegom vladina 
vlastništva poduzeća i predsjedničkog političkog sustava.
Ključne riječi: regulacija, razvijene države, međudržavne razlike, čimbenici regu-
lacije, ekonometrijska analiza.
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